## **EXHIBIT C**

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 2 WESTERN SECTION 3 4 Docket No. CR 04-30126-MAP 5 DONALD HUTCHINS Springfield, MA 6 ν. CARDIAC SCIENCE . September 9, 2004 ...... 11:38 a.m. 7 CARDIAC SCIENCE 8 9 TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING HELD BEFORE 10 THE HONORABLE MICHAEL A. PONSOR, 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE. 12 13 14 APPEARANCES: 15 16 For the plaintiff: Donald C. Hutchins, 1047 Longmeadow Street, Longmeadow, MA 01106. 17 For the defendant: Randall T. Skaar, 4800 IDS Center, 80 18 South Eighth Street, Minneapolis MN 55402-2100. 19 20 Adam Basch, 33 State Street, Springfield, MA 01103. 21 22 Alice Moran, CSR, RPR, RMR Official Federal Court Reporter 23 1550 Main Street, Room 536 Springfield, MA 01103 24 Tel: 413-731-0086 Fax: 413-737-7333

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foreign or alien environment for you to be in here today arguing your case.

You should feel free to ask me to express myself more clearly. I'm going to try to make things as simple as I possibly can so that they're understandable to you.

This is not -- it is not unusual for me to have people to come to court who are representing themselves. It is a little unusual to have someone representing themself in a case this complex I will tell you, and to that extent you are at something of a disadvantage.

I want to try to make sure, to the extent that I possibly can, to keep the playing field level and I'm not going to burst into Latin or anything like that. I'll try to keep my remarks as straightforward as possible, but I won't be offended if you're confused about something and need some explanation. I'm going to try to make sure that the hearing we have here is as fair as I possibly can make it.

> MR. HUTCHINS: I appreciate that.

THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Hutchins is here representing himself pro se and representing the defendants?

MR. SKAAR: Randall Skaar for Cardiac Science and I'm here with Adam Basch from Bacon & Wilson, local counsel.

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Science but with Complient.

And I think if you read the agreements, it's pretty apparent that the 7 1/2 percent that's really at the bottom of this that Mr. Hutchins thinks he's entitled to, that will never come from Cardiac Science no matter how you read these agreements or look at it.

If that event was triggered to pay the 7 1/2 percent to Mr. Hutchins, that would have to be paid by Complient or one of those entities surrounding Complient.

THE COURT: Is Complient a corporation, or what kind of a beast is Complient?

MR. SKAAR: Well, I thought you did a pretty good job when you were explaining it all, but the agreements we have show County Line Limited transferring some IEP rights to another entity which became the CPR Limited Partnership and then eventually County Line became Compliant. So they stood in the shoes of County Line so that's how the agreements, the way I read them, kind of hook up.

So now Complient was in partnership -- was a general partner in a partnership with CPR Limited Partnership.

CPR Limited Partnership actually holds the IP assets of Mr. Hutchins, among other things.

THE COURT: So this is not a corporation. It's an assembly of people and other entities working together

in some kind of partnership?

 $$\operatorname{MR}$  SKAAR: Well, they call themselves a corporation.

MR. HUTCHINS: It is a Delaware corporation.

MR. SKAAR: They call themselves a corporation, but they are as a corporation a general partner I believe in another entity and it is complicated but I don't think it's necessarily relevant to what's going on today.

The other fact that's interesting, and I know that Mr. Hutchins has made a Rule 19 motion here to try to bring in Complient Corporation and I just received yesterday from Complient Corporation a courtesy copy of a compliant that they have filed against Mr. Hutchins in Ohio on these very same issues.

THE COURT: Is that in a federal district court or the state court?

MR. SKAAR: State court. I have a copy here with a coffee stain on it that I did this morning if you'd like to have this copy, but basically it's asking for declaratory judgment that they own the IP outright and don't owe him any money.

So those issues are now being addressed elsewhere. I think that will make it even harder now to bring Complient here under the first to file rules we have because I think they are the first one to address that

Cardiac Science has assets. And even if they didn't, Mr. Hutchins isn't a creditor yet. So why should we be taking this extraordinary remedy and interfering with a lot of stock and a big sale just to preserve a damage pool for Mr. Hutchins when he's not yet a creditor?

I don't see how his case is different than any other breach of contract -- hundreds of breach of contracts and patent infringement cases that are out there. There's nothing special about this one, at least nothing that he's pled.

And then there's this problem with the lock-up agreement that I think Mr. Hutchins actually recognizes. On his proposed order he says "The court orders Cardiac Science and the lock-up trustee," you know, not -- well, he acknowledges the fact that we need jurisdiction over the lock-up trustee because in fact Cardiac Science doesn't have the stock anymore. It's held in trust and that's of course what the two companies did. They didn't want either one of them to have control over it. They had to sit in trust and then was released on this timing schedule.

So Cardiac Science doesn't have — there's nothing to enjoin Cardiac Science from doing. Their duties are done. They had to pay their stock just like writing the check for this stuff, and therefore there's nothing to

enjoin anyway.

But I think a more serious question is why would we be doing this? What is so extraordinary about this case that we have to somehow create a damage pool for Mr. Hutchins even though we're so far away from him being a judgment of creditor of any kind.

and then I can see a problem with that justification. I mean, one justification is that this is just a little bit like an attachment. He thinks that he's going to get a judgment against Complient eventually I guess because the papers say that Price Waterhouse says that Complient or maybe it says that your client doesn't have much in way of assets.

MR. SKAAR: That's my client.

trying to get a hold of it with the idea that he will eventually obtain judgment. And that if he doesn't grab the asset now, there will be no way to pay the judgment. So it's like seizing somebody's equity in somebody's house I suppose by putting a lien. If somebody's dog bites your kid and you bring a lawsuit, they don't have very much money so you file a motion to attach their house so when you obtain judgement, you'll have something to collect against.

because Complient continued to pay him and even attached a check that was after the alleged time that he took the IP back for a royalty check on the very intellectual property.

THE COURT: This is the December 2003 check?

MR. SKAAR: That's correct. And, of course,
there's nothing in the record but, you know, Cardiac
Science continues to pay him royalties under the very
same agreement. So we think that we own that. I don't
think he's cashing them but he's getting them.

So there is a dispute under the agreement that has to be handled under the agreement, and there's condition precedent under the agreement and the mandatory arbitration clause under the agreement. And again this screams all for Complient to be here because really this needs to be — he is alleging that breach happened when Complient owned it, and I think if Mr. Hutchins can get through all this and show that in fact he did take his IP back, then he could sue us for patent infringement because we wouldn't have a viable license. Of course, we'd sue Complient for indemnification because we just paid a bunch of money for it, but this is way too premature.

He has to show -- and now Complient has sued him in Ohio on that very same issue saying we own it. There are